If only this were a joke.

Hezbollah backer Samar al-Hajj has recruited a ship full of women to provoke another altercation with the IDF over the Gaza blockade, including a nun and a “heavily pregnant” mother.  One can only wonder what’s next in their arsenal?  A shipful of cute big-brown-eyed puppies? A floating hospital? A kindergarten class on a school trip?

And despite claims that they will not be traveling with so much as a kitchen knife, I would seriously wonder whether that nun aboard is even really Catholic and what she might be hiding under her habit. And, as for the pregnant mother, it’s obvious that these people have no scruples and no morality when it comes to life and their children (watch any Islamist propagandist TV show and you’ll see it clearly before long), so I wouldn’t put it past her to be on a suicide mission for herself or even her unborn child (after all, hearing how they speak of their pride in birthing and raising children for martyrdom, one can only imagine how proud she’d be of a child who was able to “achieve” such a great “accomplishment” before even being born!).

Israel has every right to blockade a territory from which terror is launched against them, and Gaza has been such a territory ever since Israel foolishly trusted the Palestinian two-faced, hypocritical, lowlife leaders and uprooted their citizens from there, leaving it Judenrein.

If other countries and activist organizations want to challenge that blockade, then they are clearly going into this with the simple and straightforward knowledge that they are challenging the security of a sovereign country, not to mention directly challenging the power and authority of an entire army, and they therefore are well aware of the consequences and consequently deserve everything that comes their way.

If these activists’ objective is really about providing “humanitarian aid” to Gazans, then there is clearly a channel for that, as described and provided by Israel, with Israel even guaranteeing the activists’ ability to monitor the distribution. The only proviso is that the “aid” must be inspected first. If, as the activists claim, the supplies are nothing but benign medical supplies and the like, then they should have no problem with that. If, on the other hand, they do have a problem with that, then we can clearly question either: (1) the activists’ true motives; or (2) the content of the “humanitarian” supplies.

As it turns out, though, based on the last flotilla, we can actually question both of the above. After all, the last flotilla clearly had motives other than benevolent humanitarian aid (in fact, the notorious Mavi Marmara didn’t even have any humanitarian supplies aboard; just terrorists armed with knives, clubs, metal rods, and apparently even firearms).

Additionally, the organizers of the last flotilla clearly were not overly concerned about the contents of the “humanitarian” supplies: amidst all the knives, clubs, rods, and other weapons, most of the actual supplies (contact lenses, medications, etc.) were found to be past their expiration dates and virtually unusable by any professional medical organization. (Not that it matters, because Hamas, the corrupt terrorist Gazan authority, ultimately confiscates everything anyway and the average Gazan doesn’t ever see any of it.)

I sincerely hope that Israel stands their ground and does not cave in to all those international talking-head ninnies sitting safely in their comfortable homes under no threat of constant attack (nay, annihilation!). Doing so would only end up setting a precedent of letting such holes make their way into their blockade under pressure and, once they do that, the whole purpose of a blockade is defeated and Israel might as well just start supplying weapons to the Palestinians themselves. (Oh, wait… don’t they already do that?!… my, what a tragic joke this whole situation has become, and all because of “international opinion”…)

Ronen Bergman wrote a great analytical piece in the WSJ yesterday regarding Hezbollah’s strength. Following the 2006 Lebanon War, all indications were that Hezbollah came out the winner and was only growing in military strength and political clout. Bergman gives us several reasons why this semi-victory was very short-lived and why Hezbollah appears to be losing strength, significance, and clout daily. This curious dynamic when combined with Iran’s instability and the relationship between the two, ends up being a major focus of Israeli analysts in many concerns: fighting Hezbollah’s terrorism, relationship with Lebanon, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, etc.

The article is a great read in full, but for those who don’t have the time, here’s an excerpt from the back half of the article:

…all is not rosy for Hezbollah. After the war, considerable dissatisfaction with the organization was voiced inside Lebanon. Many blamed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, for Israel’s retaliatory bombardments that caused widespread damage. Nasrallah stated that had he known Israel would respond as forcefully as it did, he would have thought twice before ordering the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers—the act that sparked the conflict.

Harsh criticism of Hezbollah also came from an unexpected source: Tehran. The Iranian strategy calls for Hezbollah to play two roles. One is to instigate minor border provocations. The other is to launch, on Tehran’s command, a full-scale retaliatory attack should Israel target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The 2006 war met neither criterion, and, as the Iranians complained, merely served to reveal the extent of Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

Then, in February 2008, Imad Mughniyeh, the organization’s military commander and Nasrallah’s close associate, was killed in a car bomb in Damascus. The assassination of the man who topped the FBI’s most-wanted list prior to Osama bin Laden was a severe blow to morale, as well as to Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities. Nasrallah was convinced that the Mossad was responsible, and vowed to take revenge “outside of the Israel-Lebanon arena.”

The Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, which is also responsible for protecting the country’s legations abroad, has been on high alert ever since. But as of today, Hezbollah has not exacted its revenge. This fact was a topic of discussions at a high-level secret forum of Israel’s intelligence services that took place from late July to early September.

Israeli officials raised four possible reasons for Hezbollah’s failure to act, all of which reflect its current weakness.

First, no replacement has been found for Mughniyeh, whose strategic brilliance, originality and powers of execution are sorely missed by Hezbollah.

Second, Israel’s intelligence coverage of Iran and Hezbollah is far superior today to what it was in the past. Planned attacks, including one targeting the Israeli Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, have all been foiled. The Israeli security services have warned Israeli businessmen abroad of possible abduction attempts by Hezbollah. They also shared information with Egyptian authorities that led to the arrest of members of a Hezbollah network who intended to kill Israeli tourists in Sinai. The arrest of these operatives resulted in sharp public exchanges between Egypt, Hezbollah and its Iranian masters, when Nasrallah admitted that these, in fact, were his men.

Third, Nasrallah cannot afford to be viewed domestically as the cause of yet another retaliation against Lebanon. Any act of revenge that he contemplates needs to be carefully calibrated. On the one hand, it needs to hurt the enemy and be spectacular enough to stoke Hezbollah pride. On the other hand, it cannot be so murderous as to cause Israel to respond with force. To complicate matters further, Israel has made it clear that because Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government, despite the fact that the party that it backed lost in the recent election, any Hezbollah action against Israel would be viewed as an action taken by the Lebanese government. Thus Israel would regard Lebanese infrastructure as a legitimate target for a military response.

Finally, there are the Iranians. Their primary focus is on proceeding with their nuclear program without unnecessary distractions. Tehran’s main concern is that a terror attack that can be linked to Iran would result in the arrest of its agents overseas, who are currently procuring equipment for its uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

Tehran has avoided direct involvement in foreign terrorism ever since 1996, when a group of Iranians were convicted in Germany of murdering political opponents of the Iranian regime. And unlike in the past (as, for instance, in the case of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in retaliation for the assassination of Nasrallah’s predecessor), it is now reluctant to place intelligence resources at Hezbollah’s disposal. This is a serious blow to Hezbollah, which is not yet able to function as a full-fledged independent operational organization internationally.

Hezbollah is also clearly aware of the severe blow in terms of power and prestige that the Iranian mullahs suffered as a result of the massive protests following June’s presidential election. Automatic support from Tehran is no longer a certainty. For now, at least, the Iranian hardliners have troubles of their own.

In short, despite the fact that Hezbollah today is substantially stronger in purely military terms than it was three years ago, its political stature and its autonomy have been significantly reduced. It is clear that Nasrallah is cautious and he will weigh his options very carefully before embarking on any course of action that might lead to all-out war with Israel. There are some experts in Israel who believe that even Hezbollah’s retaliatory role in the Iranian game plan is currently in question.

Whether or not this is the case, all of this is being considered in Jerusalem as part of Israel’s calculations about whether to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.